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INTRODUCTION  
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is concerned with the detailed 
examination of personal lived experience. IPA is part of a family of 
phenomenological psychology approaches, all of which differ to some degree in 
their theoretical emphases and methodological commitments but are in broad 
agreement about the relevance of an experiential perspective for the discipline. 
IPA avows a phenomenological commitment to examine a topic, as far as is 
possible, in its own terms. For IPA this inevitably involves an interpretative 
process on the part of both researcher and participant. IPA is concerned with the 
detailed examination of particulars, first providing an in-depth account of each 
case before moving to look for patternings of convergence and divergence across 
cases.  A text offering a detailed account of the theoretical foundations and 
empirical practices of IPA was published in 2009 (Smith, Flowers and Larkin). 
 
IPA was first articulated in the UK in the 1990s and initially was picked up as an 
approach to the psychology of experience in health and clinical/counselling 
psychology. Since then it has considerably widened its reach. It is now one of the 
best established qualitative approaches in UK psychology but is also used 
increasingly by psychology researchers throughout the world. In parallel to this 
growth has been a broadening of the domains of inquiry IPA is employed in. One 
now finds IPA research in organizational studies (e.g. de Miguel, Lizaso, 
Larranaga & Arrospide, 2015; Tomkins & Eatough, 2014), education (e.g. 
Denovan & Macaskill, 2013; Thurston, 2014), health (Seamark et al. 2004, 
Cassidy et al. 2011), sports science (see Smith, in prep) and the humanities 
(Hefferon and Ollis, 2006). What appeals to researchers in these diverse fields is 
IPA’s explicit commitment to understanding phenomena of interest from a first 
person perspective and its belief in the value of subjective knowledge for 
psychological understanding. 
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Beyond these developments, IPA continues to mature with evidence of 
researchers adopting a creative and imaginative stance to the approach which is 
in keeping with its original spirit – to provide qualitative researchers with ways 
of thinking about and researching psychological topics which are underpinned by 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. As part of the process of helping researchers 
to conduct excellent hermeneutic phenomenological research, one of us has 
written papers elaborating evaluative criteria for what constitutes a good IPA 
study (Smith, 2011a, 2011b) and these will be discussed later in the chapter. 
  
The chapter begins with a discussion of IPA’s intellectual origins emphasizing 
the phenomenological and hermeneutic touchstones which inform it. Following 
this, some key characteristics of IPA will be identified and described, namely, 
experience, idiography and interpretation. IPA has always encouraged 
engagement with other qualitative approaches as well as working with 
developments in mainstream psychology and these will be reflected on paying 
particular attention to cognition and language. This will be followed by a section 
examining the current picture of IPA research. We finish the chapter with some 
concluding thoughts. 
 
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF IPA: PHENOMENOLOGY & HERMENEUTICS 
IPA has a long and a short history. Although its articulation as a specific 
approach to qualitative research began in the mid 1990s (Smith, 1994, 1996), it 
connects with much longer intellectual currents in phenomenology and 
hermeneutics and with a quiet and persistent concern in psychology with 
subjective experience and personal accounts (James, 1890; Allport, 1953). 
Indeed a key motivation for the development of IPA was the articulation of a 
qualitative approach which locates itself firmly within psychology and 
acknowledges the discipline’s historical lineage with respect to qualitative 
research (Eatough, 2012). In this section, our aim is to discuss some of the key 
ideas from phenomenology and hermeneutics which underpin IPA and situate it 
as an experiential approach to doing research that owns explicitly the 
interpretative activity of the researcher. For a detailed exposition of the theory 
and philosophy which informs IPA readers are referred to Smith et al., (2009). 
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Phenomenology 
Phenomenological philosophy is best conceived of as an ongoing project, one 
that aims “to bring philosophy back from abstract metaphysical speculation 
wrapped up in pseudo-problems, in order to come into contact with the matters 
themselves, with concrete living experience.” (Moran, 2000: xiii).  Husserl’s 
rallying call ‘To the things themselves’ (Zu den Sachen) expresses the 
phenomenological intention to describe how the world is formed and 
experienced through consciousness. This intention is often understood as a 
‘stripping away’ of our preconceptions and biases (such as those from science, 
tradition, common-sense), exposing the taken-for-granted and revealing the 
essence of the phenomenon whilst transcending the contextual and personal. For 
Husserl, this necessitates a shift from the natural attitude to the 
phenomenological attitude through a series of reductions leading back to the 
experience itself uncluttered by the detritus of prejudices acquired through the 
process of living one’s life.  For example, the end point of the Husserlian 
reductions is not the individual train journey we experience from our singular 
vantage point but what train journeys have in common, their whatness – the 
invariant structure which makes a train journey a train journey rather than a 
boat or car journey.  
 
Similarly, IPA is committed to clarifying and elucidating a phenomenon (be that 
an event, process or relationship) but its interest is in how this process sheds 
light on experiences as they are lived by an embodied socio-historical situated 
person. Rather than transcend the particular, IPA aims to grasp the texture and 
qualities of an experience as it is lived by an experiencing subject. The primary 
interest is the person’s experience of the phenomenon and the sense they make 
of their experience rather than the structure of the phenomenon itself. Arguably, 
it is this focus which has appealed to qualitative psychologists, especially those 
in applied areas who have a keen interest in understanding experiences of 
significant import, those which matter to individuals because they recast aspects 
of their lives through a demand for meaning making. In sum, “IPA has the more 
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modest ambition of attempting to capture particular experiences as experienced 
for particular people” (Smith et al., 2009: 16). 
 
This more particular aim connects IPA with Heidegger’s working through of the 
phenomenological project and how to carry out experiential research. For 
example, Heidegger’s proposal is that a human being is a Dasein, which literally 
means ‘being there’ but is typically understood as ‘Being-in-the-world’ (Spinelli , 
1989: 108). This resonates with IPA’s understanding of people and the worlds 
they inhabit as socially and historically contingent and contextually bounded.  
The great achievement of Dasein is that it replaces the individual predicated on 
Cartesian dualism (person/world, subject/object, mind/body and so on) with 
people as Being-in-the-world with things and with others. Our relatedness to and 
involvement in the world is mutually constitutive – we are a Being-in-the-world 
who is also a Being-with (Mitsein) in a with-world (Mitwelt).  Moreover, it is an 
already existing world of language, culture, history and so on into which we are 
thrown (Heidegger, 1962/2004).  As Merleau-Ponty (1945/2004: xii) puts it, 
‘Man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself.’ The phrase 
‘the rich tapestry of life’ gathers fresh meaning here standing for the inextricable 
interweaving of person and world and which is at odds with the idea of 
transcending the particularities of an individual life. The mutuality of Dasein is 
pushed even further by Merleau-Ponty and his ideas about how the body is a 
body-subject which discloses the world to each of us in specific ways. The 
phenomenological interest is with the lived body (Leib) not the body of 
physiological mechanisms and chemical interactions.  
 
Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is derived from the Greek verb, hermēneuein, to interpret and the 
noun hermēneia, interpretation and its aim is “to make meaning intelligible” 
(Grondin, 1994: 20). Hermeneutics began with the exegesis of biblical texts and 
has developed into a more general concern with the process of understanding 
(Palmer, 1969; Packer & Addison, 1989).   Similar to phenomenology, 
hermeneutics can be seen as an ongoing project, a form of practical philosophy, 
comprising of a wide range of thinkers and diverse traditions.  
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Within these traditions, there is a fair amount of “definitional vagueness” 
(Gallagher, 1992: 3) and commentators have attempted to impose some order on 
this conceptual complexity. For example, two key developments in the history of 
hermeneutics have been identified: a) the work of Schleiermacher, Dilthey and 
Heidegger described as representing a move from “authorial intent to the 
linguistic turn” followed by b) a further shift to “dialectical hermeneutics” 
through the work of Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur (Sandage, Cook, Hill & 
Strawn, 2008). An alternative mapping orders these thinkers and their works 
into three approaches: conservative hermeneutics (Schleiermacher and Dilthey); 
moderate hermeneutics (Gadamer and Ricoeur) and radical hermeneutics 
(Heidegger, and also Derrida and Foucault) (Gallagher, 1992: 10).  
In brief, Schleiermacher proposed a twofold interpretative perspective made up 
of the grammatical and the psychological and it is this dual stance which gives 
rise to understanding.  Similarly, Dilthey believed that the purpose of 
hermeneutics is understanding and, taking a more epistemological view, he 
proposed that hermeneutics should be the method for the human sciences. In 
addition to texts, hermeneutics can be applied to lived experience (Erlebnis) and 
understanding is the moment when ‘life understands itself’ (Dilthey, 1976). For 
both Heidegger and Gadamer, however, the emphasis is on how interpretation 
is a foundational mode of Being and that to live a life is to interpret. 
A key difference between Schleiermacher and Gadamer is the former’s focus on 
how interpretation tells us something about the individual and their individual 
intentions whereas the focus for Gadamer is the text itself and how it might be 
understand in the specific historical context it is being read. IPA aims to draw on 
both aspects in a productive manner; acknowledging Gadamer’s claim that “the 
essential nature of the historical spirit consists not in the restoration of the past 
but in thoughtful meditation with contemporary life” (Gadamer, 1990/1960: 
168-169) whilst recasting Schleiermacher for the present-day: 
The texts examined by IPA researchers are usually 
contemporary or have been produced in the recent past and in a 
response to a request by the researcher rather than a purpose 
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driven by the author. Under these circumstances we think that 
the process of analysis is geared to learning both about the 
person providing the account and the subject matter of that 
account, and therefore, that Schleiermacher usefully speaks to 
us across the centuries. (Smith et al, 2009: 37) 
Thus, for IPA, our interpretations are, amongst other things, attempts to 
understand how we have come to be situated in the world in the particular ways 
we find ourselves. This hermeneutic standpoint is similar to Richardson, Fowers 
& Guignon’s (1999) dialectical perspective: 
Our nature or being as humans is not just something we find (as 
in deterministic theories), nor is it something we make (as in 
existentialist and constructionist views); instead, it is what we 
make of what we find. (p 212) 
 
 IPA researchers acknowledge the inevitability of biases, preoccupations and 
assumptions when conducting research; they reflect on how these shape their 
research inquiries and, following Gadamer, they aim to engage with them 
fruitfully for the purpose of understanding.  This means taking a questioning and 
dialectical stance to these fore-understandings and the material they are seeking 
to understand, recognizing it is an always-unfinished activity. This is because, 
very often, we are simply not aware of what our assumptions might be when we 
begin a piece of research, rather we become aware of them as we question and 
clarify our emergent interpretations (Smith, 2007).  Importantly, our prejudices 
should not be thought of as inherently “bad”, rather we can have “good” 
prejudices which can be “bridled” (Dahlberg, 2006) and revised, giving rise to 
more useful and creative interpretations. Fischer conveys this ongoing activity 
well, giving it a sense of constant reflexive motion on the part of the researcher: 
 
The researcher repeatedly discovers what his or her 
assumptions and interpretive understandings were and 
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reexamines them against emerging insights. Findings “regestalt,” 
are again disrupted, and again “regestalt.” (Fischer, 2009: 584) 
 
In sum, Smith et al (2009) capture IPA’s dual phenomenological and 
hermeneutic framing when they say “Without the phenomenology, there would 
be nothing to interpret; without the hermeneutics, the phenomenon would not 
be seen.” (Smith, 2009: 37).  
 
KEY FEATURES OF IPA 
Experience 
Experience is the subject that IPA addresses and aims to understand in the 
context of the concrete and meaningful world of human being. Experience is a 
complex concept and for IPA it means attending to aspects of experience which 
matter to people and give rise to particular actions within a world that is 
‘always-already to hand’ and inherently meaningful. This way of thinking about 
experience is similar to that of Yancher (2015) who suggests that experience can 
be understood as concernful involvement by situated participants rather than the 
contents of a private mind: 
 
As agents who participate meaningfully in a meaningful world, humans 
encounter the events of their experience as mattering; that is, 
participational agency is characterized by a kind of care or existential 
concern with the affairs of living that provides a basis for action such as 
making judgments, taking positions, and engaging in cultural practices. 
(Yancher, 2015, p. 109) 
 
 For IPA, attending to things that matter to people means distinguishing between 
different parts of experience and making decisions about which parts to focus on. 
Smith et al. provide the following example to illustrate what they describe as a 
hierarchy of experience ranging from small experiential parts to more 
comprehensive ones: 
…imagine that you are about to take a swim in the sea on a hot 
summer day. You may not be mindful of the pebbles under your 
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feet until you remove your shoes, and then find that you have to 
hobble the last few steps down to the waterline. You may not be 
aware of the warmth of the sun on your back, until you begin to 
anticipate your first bracing contact with the cold water. 
Momentarily then, you are made aware of the flow of 
experience; for most of the time, however, you are simply 
immersed in it, rather than explicitly aware of it. Now imagine 
that the event has further significance for you: you have been a 
keen swimmer since childhood, but have not swum on a public 
beach for some years, since undergoing major surgery for a 
serious health problem. The anticipation of this swim takes on a 
host of additional meanings. Perhaps you are concerned about 
the visibility of scars or other changes to your bodily 
appearance. Perhaps you have been looking forward to this 
moment for some time, as a marker of recovery, and the return 
of a lost self. Perhaps you are simply wondering whether you 
will be able to remember how to swim! In any of these cases, the 
swim is marked for you as an experience, something important 
which is happening to you. (Smith et al., 2009:2) 
 
An IPA study could attend to the small parts of this experience, those moments of 
responsiveness such as how one becomes aware of the sun’s warmth and what it 
is like to experience it. More typically, however, IPA researchers are more likely 
to focus on how the whole experience is meaningful in the context of one’s life as 
it has been, is being and might be lived. 
 
Experience is subjective because what we experience is a phenomenal rather 
than a direct reality. We ‘stretch forth into the world’ (Spinelli, 1989: 12) 
connecting with events, objects and people in the context of how they appear to 
us. IPA attends to all aspects of this lived experience, from the individual’s 
wishes, desires, feelings, motivations, belief systems through to how these 
manifest themselves or not in behaviour and action. Whatever phenomenon is 
being studied, the emphasis is on how it is given to the person and how what is 
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given has a quality of mineness. For example, there is something it is like to drink 
a fine wine, see the sun rise over a mountain, feel the pain of migraine, receive a 
diagnosis of dementia. Understanding this first person givenness requires doing 
so from the perspective of the person experiencing it; in other words, treating 
the participant as the experiential expert in the phenomenon of interest.  
 
Another way of thinking about this is that IPA researchers are interested in 
understanding the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), the realm of immediate human 
experience (Halling & Carroll, 1999: 98) from the perspective of the reflective 
meaning-making individual. The lifeworld is what all knowledge is grounded in – 
including both our lived subjective knowledge and the objective knowledge of 
scientific abstraction – and both presuppose it. These different knowledges are 
captured beautifully by the following two descriptions of a table. The first is a 
description from the astrophysicist, Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington and the second 
a contrasting description from the philosopher, Lubica Učník:  
 
My scientific X is mostly emptiness. Sparsely scattered in that 
emptiness are numerous electrical charges rushing about with 
great speed; but their combined bulk amounts to less than a 
billionth of the bulk of the X itself. Notwithstanding its strange 
construction it turns out to be an entirely efficient X. It supports 
my Y as satisfactorily as X No. 1; for when I lay the Y on it the 
little electric particles with their headlong speed keep on hitting 
the underside, so that the Y is maintained in shuttlecock fashion 
at a nearly steady level. If I lean upon this X I shall not go 
through; or, to be accurate, the chances of my scientific Z going 
through my scientific X is so excessively small that it can be 
neglected in practical life. (Eddington, 1933: xii) 
 
It is a table that unites people when they come to visit me and 
we talk in agreement. It also seems to divide us when we 
disagree. But it is always in between us, familiar and 
dependable: to put cups of coffee on; or indeed for whatever 
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purpose we might use it at different times. I sit at that table 
when I am happy as well as when I am sad, and many memories 
come rushing in when I look at it. It is slightly damaged on one 
side from the time my daughter tried to climb up onto it and the 
table toppled onto her. Years later, she has no scars left, but the 
table reminds us of this event by the scratch that has remained 
there ever since: it is a memory writ large. I like to stroke that 
chipped table, as it reminds me of all the people who sat there 
once upon a time; and I imagine that others will sit there 
sometime in the future. It is not just a useful table that I have 
breakfast on, it is a part of my life. (Učník, 2013: 34-35)  
 
The latter description is the lifeworld. For Husserl, these two descriptions of the 
same table are not, or should not be seen, in opposition to one another; rather 
the first one, couched in scientific formalized thinking, is “our human 
achievement” (Husserl, 1970: §34d:127) and presupposes the lifeworld. 
However, it is a partial description ignoring those aspects which are significant 
and meaningful for us as we live our lives; attending to these aspects is critical 
for a full understanding of what it means to be human. Knowledge comes in 
many forms and IPA is clear about the contribution that subjective knowledge of 
this sort can make to psychological understanding. 
 
Idiography 
Idiography is concerned with how to understand the concrete, the particular and 
the unique whilst maintaining the integrity of the person. Allport (1940) noted 
the decline of the idiographic perspective, the lack of interest in the individual 
case, and the increasing neglect of experience in psychology. A focus on all three, 
he proposed, would help to redress the limitations of psychology’s 
preoccupation with actuarial predictions saying that “An entire population (the 
larger the better) is put into the grinder and the mixing is so expert that what 
comes through is a link of factors in which every individual has lost his (sic) 
identity” (Allport, 1937: 244). He concluded that psychology was becoming the 
province of ‘one-sided tests of method’ (Allport, 1940: 17).  
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Although an idiographic approach continues to sit uneasily within psychology, 
more recently an interest in the idiographic has manifested itself in the 
development of strategies such as the single-case experimental design (Barlow, 
Nock & Hersen, 2008; Barlow & Nock, 2009) as well as a range of experience 
sampling methods that emphasise natural settings and real-time and multiple 
occasions (Conner, Tennen, Fleeson & Barrett, 2009; Hurlbert, 2011; Hurlbert & 
Heavey, 2015 ). Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is one such approach 
(Heavey, Hurlbert & Lefforge, 2010) demonstrating that the idiographic, the 
personal and the contextualised is not simply a qualitative concern.  
In the context of qualitative research, IPA is resolutely idiographic, always 
beginning with the particular and ensuring that any generalizations are 
grounded in this.  Rather than taking an either/or stance, IPA argues for (a) the 
intensive examination of the individual in her/his own right as an intrinsic part 
of psychology’s remit and (b) that the logical route to universal laws and 
structures starts from an idiographic base, as indicated by Harré: 
I would want to argue for a social science … which bases itself upon an 
essentially intensive design, and which works from an idiographic basis. 
Nevertheless such a science is aimed always at a cautious climb up the 
ladder of generality, seeking for universal structures but reaching them 
only by a painful, step by step approach.  Harré (1979: 137) 
On a practical level, one way IPA studies express their commitment to the 
idiographic is by the use of single person case studies (e.g. Smith, 1991; Smith, 
Michie, Allanson and Elwy, 2000; Bramley and Eatough, 2005; Eatough & Smith, 
2006; Rhodes & Smith, 2010; Solli, 2015; Cheng, 2015). One clear advantage of a 
single person case study is that they “offer a personally unique perspective on 
their relationship to, or involvement in, various phenomena of interest.” (Smith 
et al, 2009: 29). The holistic nature of the single person case study allows what 
Mischler (1984) called ‘the voice of the lifeworld’ to become visible. Thus, the 
case is a portrayal of the person’s ways-of-being-in-the-world. However, case 
studies can do more than this; they can offer a way of seeing that illuminates and 
afﬁrms ‘the centrality of certain general themes in the lives of all particular 
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individuals’ (Evans, 1993: 8). Thus, the idiographic researcher is brought closer 
to noteworthy aspects of the general by connecting the individual unique life 
with a common humanity.  
Beyond single person cases, IPA studies more commonly use small and situated 
samples so that each individual can be attended to idiographically before 
attempting a comparative analysis of participant material. The commitment to 
detailing the diversity and variability of human experience alongside 
demonstrating what are shared experiences amongst participants can create a 
tension, albeit often a productive one, that encourages creative thinking in how 
to retain the insights of both (Thackeray, 2015). 
The potential of idiography is still being developed within IPA and in psychology 
more generally.  One way to strengthen IPA’s idiographic commitment is to 
design more studies which focus on multiple snapshots of experience and which 
emphasize patterns of meaning across time, exploring in ever more detail the 
historical and social contingencies of individual lifeworlds. We come back to this 
later in the chapter and point to how studies are beginning to do this. 
 
Interpretation 
IPA is an explicitly interpretative endeavour and this section introduces two 
ways this endeavour might be realized in practice, namely the careful 
development of and navigation between layers of interpretation and the concept 
of the ‘gem’ (Smith, 2011).  Underpinning this interpretative engagement are: the 
hermeneutic circle that lies at the heart of hermeneutic theory, Heidegger’s 
notion of appearing, and IPA’s “double hermeneutic” (Smith & Osborn, 2003) and 
these three ideas will be discussed first. 
The hermeneutic circle encourages researchers to work with their data in a 
dynamic, iterative and non-linear manner, examining the whole in light of its 
parts, the parts in light of the whole, and the contexts in which the whole and 
parts are embedded and doing so from a stance of being open to shifting ways of 
thinking what the data might mean. One way that IPA thinks about this 
part/whole dynamic is as a set of relationships which can be used to work 
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interpretively with the data: 
 The part   The whole 
The single word  The sentence in which the word is embedded 
The single extract  The complete text 
The particular text  The complete oeuvre 
The interview  The research project 
The single episode  The complete life  
(Smith et al, 2009: 28) 
 
Moving between these parts and wholes is one way of gleaning meanings from 
the material which can themselves be examined and amplified.  
 
Smith et al. use Heidegger’s notion of appearing to suggest that interpretation is 
similar to the work of detection. As such the researcher is mining the material for 
possible meanings which allow the phenomenon of interest to “shine forth” 
(Smith et al, 2009: 35). In turn, these meanings are examined critically, 
compared with each other as well as with the researcher’s evolving and shifting 
fore-understandings. However, this shining forth of the phenomenon is always in 
the context of the lifeworld of an embodied situated person. IPA’s double 
hermeneutic is a reminder of this and is captured by the phrase “The researcher 
is trying to make sense of the participant trying to make sense of what is 
happening to them.” (Smith et al, 2009: 3). Here, the double hermeneutic points 
to how interpretation and understanding involves a synthesis, in this instance, of 
research participants’ sense-making (typically in an interview setting) and that 
of the researcher during the stages of analysis. 
 
Doing IPA involves navigating between different layers of interpretation as one 
engages deeply with texts of participants’ personal experience (Smith, 2004). 
The double hermeneutic can be invoked here also, suggesting that interpretative 
layers arise out of a dual interpretative engagement: a hermeneutics of empathy 
or affirmation and a hermeneutics of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970).  For Ricoeur, 
interpretation is “the work of thought which exists in deciphering the hidden 
meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in 
the literal meaning” (Ricoeur, 1974, cited in Kearney, 1994: 101). For IPA, these 
two hermeneutics are employed to encourage researchers to adopt a both/and 
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approach; on the one hand to assume an empathic stance and imagine what-it-is-
like to be the participant, whilst on the other hand, to be critical of what appears 
to be the case and probing for meaning in ways which participants might be 
unwilling or unable to do themselves. The former aims to produce rich 
experiential understandings of the phenomenon under investigation and remain 
close to the participant’s sense-making. The latter involves the researcher 
putting aside what they have previously accepted at face value in order to 
develop a textured multilayered narrative of possible meanings. However, it is 
always the case, that for IPA, the starting point is the participant who is 
privileged as the source for the interpretative activity of the researcher. This sort 
of work requires sustained immersion in the data, pushing for more ﬁne-grained 
interpretations whilst at the same time attempting to keep interpretative order. 
 
Developing interpretative layers 
To illustrate this textured multi-layering, we present examples from two 
different studies, one on chronic pain (Osborn & Smith, 1998), the second on 
women’s anger and aggression (Eatough and Smith, 2006b).  
In the first example, four possible interpretations are offered which mirror the 
movement between the two hermeneutic positions (empathy and suspicion) 
described above. In an interview focusing on her experience of living with 
chronic pain, Linda says:  
I just think I’m the fittest because there are three girls and I’m 
the middle one and I thought well I’m the fittest and I used to 
work like a horse and I thought I was the strongest and then all 
of a sudden it’s just been cut down and I can’t do half of what I 
used to. (Osborn & Smith, 1998, p70) 
There are several interpretative possibilities here, potentialities of meaning 
which can shed light on what might be going on for Linda. Taking this at face 
value and holistically (as in the parts and wholes discussed earlier) one 
understanding is that Linda is comparing herself to her sisters in order to 
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emphasize how her pain has changed her. There seems little to dispute here; it is 
easy to imagine oneself in a similar situation and comparing oneself to others in 
order to get a grasp of what is happening. However, as Osborn & Smith go on to 
show, one can be more interrogative and focus in on Linda’s metaphoric use of 
working like a horse. Clearly, Linda and we know that she was never as strong as 
a horse but describing herself as such exaggerates the strength she had in the 
past in order to draw attention to how weak and fragile she feels in comparison 
now.  Similarly when Linda describes being cut down it evokes images of a 
scythe slicing through a field of grass or a crop of hay.  
Deepening the interpretative engagement, one can examine the temporal 
referents. See Box 1, an extract from a paper by Jonathan (Smith, 2004) which 
pursues this. 
 
 
Linda begins in the present tense: 
 
I just think I’m the fittest because there are three girls and 
I’m the middle one. 
 
So initially one might assume Linda is referring to herself now / well yes 
there probably are still three of them and her birth order won’t have 
changed, but I’m the fittest? Surely she means ‘I used to be the fittest’, in 
contrast to how she is now? And indeed she then slips into the past   
tense: 
 
And I thought well I’m the fittest and I used to work like 
a horse and I thought I was the strongest. 
 
This seems to confirm that Linda is referring to a time in the past  
when  she had such great strength and which she has now lost. So how 
does one explain the apparent contradiction- ‘I am the fittest’, ‘I was the 
fittest’? Well I think this goes to the heart of the psychological battle for 
Linda, as her sense of identity is ravaged by her back pain. Thus, on the 
one hand, Linda acknowledges that she has lost an identity a strong, 
proud and autonomous self, which has been replaced by an enfeebled 
and vulnerable self. On the other hand, Linda still ‘identifies’ with the 
strong self  so that in part her sense of who she is is still represented by 
the super-fit being in the image. Thus Linda is struggling between being 
taken over by a new self, defined by her chronic pain, and hanging on to 
an old self, in spite of that pain. This struggle is literally illustrated in the 
temporal changes in the passage itself. 
 
                              Box 1: Shifting time in Linda’s extract 
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This is a close reading of the data, a stretching of the interpretative threads 
which are tethered to Linda’s actual words and which is likely to be supported 
with evidence elsewhere in the account. What IPA resists, certainly in the early 
stages, is top down interpretations, those that import theory before one has had 
the chance to dwell with the data and work towards disclosing meaning. For 
example, as Jonathan points out in his paper a psychoanalytic interpretation 
might be that the horse symbolizes Linda’s sexual appetite which is frustrated by 
her pain. This psychoanalytic meaning-making is not necessarily wrong but it 
goes beyond the interpretative work of IPA and does risk severing the threads 
which connect the various possibilities of meaning and the account itself. 
 
In the anger study we demonstrated the interpretative range of IPA, showcasing 
interpretations that were more closely grounded in participants' own accounts 
(Eatough, Smith & Shaw, 2008) and ones which were more probing and 
questioning of their meaning making (Eatough & Smith, 2006a, 2006b).   To 
illustrate this range here, we present three extracts from interviews with a 
participant we have called Marilyn. In the first one, Marilyn is offering a reason 
for her anger, namely a hormonal one: 
It’s awful but I mean that’s all hormones as well which explains 
away a lot of my moods and aggression and that. But I mean I 
don’t know whether it I mean I have got a lot of hang ups about 
my family but I think a lot of it is hormonal my aggression and 
things like that. 
What are the possible meanings that might be disclosed by a close and critical 
interpretative engagement? From the hermeneutic stance of empathy, the 
researcher can accept Marilyn’s claim that hormones are responsible for her 
anger and point to how the claim negates alternative understandings and 
enables Marilyn to not take responsibility for her actions because the assertion 
can be seen as arising out of a biomedical discourse which denies agency. 
Alternatively, adopting a hermeneutics of suspicion means the researcher might 
home in on the phrase. “I have got a lot of hang ups about my family” and 
question the robustness of Marilyn’s hormonal sense making. Indeed, Marilyn 
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does have a troubled relationship with her family; in particular a painful 
relationship with her mother and the pervasive presence of this relationship in 
her accounts pointed to the importance of maintaining a more critical and 
probing attitude. As Kearney says, “it is not sufficient simply to describe meaning 
as it appears; we are also obliged to interpret it as it conceals itself.” (Kearney, 
1994: 94) 
Marilyn described a relationship deﬁned by feelings of rejection and 
separateness: 
My mum was always with my brother, he was always you know, he 
was the lad and my mum used to be like, say that I used to look like 
my dad and she didn’t like my dad so I always thought she didn’t 
like me. It was that type of relationship, not close at all. 
The first sentence captures our attention and it shows that Marilyn thinks her 
mother prefers her brother to her. We can reflect that by the time most children 
reach adulthood, they are aware that there are qualitative differences in the 
ways they are loved by their parents. For many people, this can be a positive 
experience in that their individual qualities make up who they are and they are 
loved, if not because of them, then at least in spite of them. However, feeling that 
a sibling is preferred over oneself is very different, especially if that preference is 
overlaid with a negative comparison to a disliked and absent parent.  
Staying with the first sentence we can reflect further on Marilyn’s use of the 
word with and offer a tentative interpretation that mother and brother have a 
shared identity that excludes Marilyn and places her outside. To give support to 
this interpretation, we look for substantiation elsewhere in the data. And in this 
case it is not hard to ﬁnd: 
She was always my brother [sic]. I mean my brother could never do 
anything wrong but I think that was because she was in two minds 
whether he was my stepfather’s. She, I think she’d been having an 
affair with him and I think she might have thought he was my 
stepfather’s and not my real dad’s. She used to always compare me 
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to my dad in my ways and my looks and my actions and that and it 
just wasn’t, but I mean there was never any affection. I mean I can’t 
remember ever her putting her arm around me and kissing me. My 
stepdad he used to, but my mum never. My dad was very loving. I 
remember that, he really was. 
The opening sentence carries tremendous symbolic weight; her mother and 
brother do not simply have a close bond, rather it appears they have 
psychologically merged for Marilyn into ‘one’ person. This supports the shared 
identity reading and at the same time pushes the interpretation further: Marilyn 
experiences the identiﬁcation between mother and brother as not simply shared 
but actually merged. 
Symmetrically, Marilyn and her father have become ‘one’, and it is a ‘one’ that is 
hated by her mother. From Marilyn’s perspective, there is a clear division 
between herself and her father who looked and behaved the same (the old 
family); and her mother, brother and stepfather (the new family). We do not 
know when Marilyn ﬁrst became aware that her brother might be her 
stepbrother but whenever the suspicion arose it offered her an explanation for 
the perceived rejection. But having an explanation does not ease Marilyn’s pain; 
rather mother and brother and stepfather have become identiﬁed in a way that 
Marilyn feels excluded from. They form a nexus which ampliﬁes Marilyn’s sense 
of separateness. 
Thus, in both examples, there is a deepening interpretative reading which shifts 
from foregrounding the participants’ meaning making to harnessing that of the 
researchers. The meaning making of the researchers includes some more 
abstract properties and reflects their psychological thinking. For Linda, this 
thinking centres around identity issues whilst for Marilyn, the focus is on the 
damage that can be done when significant family relationships are experienced 
as isolating and polarized. In both cases however the researchers’ thinking is still 
prompted by, and responding to, the account by the participant 
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The concept of the gem 
In a 2011 paper, Jonathan proposed the concept of the gem as a valuable 
interpretative tool for IPA specifically and experiential qualitative psychology 
more generally. The key feature of the gem concept is its capacity to illuminate 
and enhance interpretation and understanding. Typically the gem is a singular 
remark which jumps out at the researcher or a small extract from an entire 
interview that the researcher is drawn to and has a hunch might be key to 
understanding “a person’s grasp of their world.” (Ashworth, 2008:4-5). In 
response to the question of what gems do, Smith proposes that they can provide 
analytic leverage, shine light on the phenomenon under study, on a whole 
interview transcript or even the entire corpus of data (Smith, 2011c: 7).  
Smith proposes a spectrum of three types of gem: shining, suggestive and secret. 
A gem that shines literally shines with meaning; the meaning is manifest. For 
example, Smith recounts an example from a study by Seri (2009) of a Jewish 
mother who describes her son’s circumcision saying, “Everybody’s watching my 
son being chopped to pieces.” (p206). Smith explains why this is a shining gem: 
I think it is a brilliant utterance because it is literally true. 
Circumcision involves removing a piece of skin, so that her son, 
who was once intact, has now been chopped into pieces: a little 
piece and a big piece. The potency of the expression, however, 
lies in its ability to convey the psychological impact of this 
simple procedure…And it’s a shining gem because so much is 
already manifest, it requires less peering or probing to work out 
what the meaning of the extract is. (Smith, 2011c: 11) 
With a suggestive gem the meaning is less manifest, less present and the 
researcher has to work harder to disclose the meaning, moving repeatedly 
around and within the hermeneutic circle. Finally the secret gem is the most 
elusive, can be easily missed and only shows itself through an absorbed 
attentiveness with the material which allows “this small quiet part to be 
illuminated by the larger and louder corpus in which it is embedded” (Smith, 
2011c: 13). Marilyn’s utterance “She was always my brother” which was 
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discussed earlier is one example of a secret gem. 
 
COGNITION AND LANGUAGE 
Whilst IPA takes a critical stance towards many of the dominant methodological 
and epistemological assumptions of the discipline, it challenges these from 
within by adopting an interrogative position to both its own ﬁndings and the 
extant psychological literature. For example, it shares Bruner’s (1990) regret 
that the cognitive revolution led to a cognitive psychology of information 
processing rather than a psychology whose core concern was meaning making as 
originally envisaged. 
Smith (1996) has pointed to how both social cognition and IPA share a concern 
with unravelling the relationship between what people think (cognition), say 
(account) and do (behaviour). Both epistemologically and methodologically this 
concern manifests itself differently; IPA’s conceives of cognition as “dilemmatic, 
affective and embodied. It is complex, changeable, and can be hard to pin down, 
but it is cognition none the less.” (Smith et al, 2009: 191). IPA studies aim to 
demonstrate that when people are thinking and deliberating about significant 
events in their lives, this thinking is an aspect of Being-in-the–world and not 
simply detached disembodied cognitive activity. This is more akin to how some 
artiﬁcial intelligence theorists drawing on phenomenology talk of structural 
couplings in which ‘Thinking is not detached reﬂection but part of our basic 
attitude to the world’ (Mingers, 2001: 110). 
For example, in a study examining how families think about the process of 
donating the brain of a family member, it was clear that the decision was not 
simply made through the rational deliberation of a person simply weighing up 
the pros and cons as the information processing perspective would have us 
believe. Rather, emotions, feelings and context were inextricably caught up with 
attempts to be rational (Eatough, Shaw & Lees, 2012:15). This insight grounded 
in personal descriptions of the how of decision making supports and adds flesh 
to current cognitive psychological theorising that suggests decision making is 
underpinned by two qualitatively dissimilar systems: one that is affective, fast 
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and intuitive and one that is more deliberative (Usher, Russo, Weyers, Brauner & 
Zakay, 2011). IPA’s re-appropriation of cognition has been fruitful, leading to a 
body of studies with ramiﬁcations for policy change in a wide range of arenas 
(e.g. Flowers, Smith, Sheeran and Beail, 1997; Oke, Rostill-Brookes & Larkin, 
2012; Burton, Shaw & Gibson, 2013; Spiers, Smith & Drage, 2015). Similarly, IPA 
researchers see fertile ground for collaboration with those cognitive scientists 
who are drawing on phenomenological philosophy to inform their embodied 
active situated cognition (EASC) approach (Larkin, Eatough & Osborn, 2011). 
 
In sum, for IPA, cognition lies at the heart of the phenomenological project but it 
is a cognition that is “dynamic, multi-dimensional, affective, embodied, and 
intricately connected with our engagement with the world.” (Smith et al, 
2009:191). Following Husserl, IPA researchers wish to understand ‘the 
experiences in which something comes to be grasped as known’ (Moran, 2000: 
108.  (See Smith et al, 2009 for a discussion of the relationship between 
cognition and reflection). 
Just as IPA conceives of cognition differently from cognitive psychology, it thinks 
about language in a fundamentally different way from discursive studies. The 
poststructuralist and social/cultural constructionist underpinnings of discursive 
psychology leads to an emphasis on the effects of language and discourse and 
what might be accomplished through talk, text and so on (Willig, 2012: 111). 
From this perspective, discursive researchers are interested in how people talk 
about and construct their experiences. In contrast, IPA, drawing from Heidegger, 
subscribes to a more expressivist ontology, viewing people as existential world-
disclosers in a world of situated concernful involvement (see earlier section on 
experience) rather than epistemic world-constructors (Yancher, 2015): 
 
In this respect, it might be said that participational agents 
disclose (or reveal) a world through their concernful 
involvement; or that the world shows up for agents based on 
what they are doing as part of their fully-embodied, largely tacit 
practical involvement in the world. (Yancher, 2015: 111)  
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 This position is not unlike that of symbolic interactionists such as Mead (1934) 
and Blumer (1969), both of whom espouse a particular image of human beings 
as creative agents who have a hand in constituting (as opposed to constructing) 
their social worlds, despite limitations imposed by material and biological 
conditions and social, cultural, historical linguistic processes. This is possible, in 
part, by appropriating, reﬁguring and discarding the linguistic conventions and 
discursive practices of one’s culture. 
 
Of course, IPA recognizes the action oriented nature of talk and that people 
negotiate and achieve interpersonal objectives in their conversations, and that 
reality is both contingent upon and constrained by the language of one’s culture. 
Therefore it shares some ground with discursive psychology (Willig, 2003). 
However, IPA suggests that this represents only a partial account of what people 
are doing when they communicate. For IPA the lived life with its many 
vicissitudes is much more than historically situated linguistic interactions 
between people. 
For instance, if we consider emotion: even if emotions and emotionality are 
discursive acts which can be analysed ‘something like conversations’ (Harré and 
Gillett, 1994: 154), they are not simply language games and/or an effect of 
discourse. Missing from such accounts are the private, psychologically forceful, 
rich and often indeﬁnable aspects of emotional life. As Chodorow (1999: 165) 
points out: ‘even emotion words and emotional concepts must have individual 
resonance and personal meaning’. She goes on to say: 
That thoughts and feelings are entangled and that thoughts are 
thought in culturally speciﬁc languages – these ideas do not mean 
that there is no private feeling or that any particular thought has 
only a public cultural meaning. Culturally recognizable thoughts or 
emotion terms can also be entwined in a web of thought-infused 
feelings and feeling-infused thoughts experienced by an individual 
as she creates her own psychic life within a set of interpersonal and 
cultural relations. (Chodorow, 1999: 166) 
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Our telling of the events in our life has personal relevance and an ongoing 
signiﬁcance for the individual concerned (Smith, 1996). We propose that when 
people tell stories of their lives, they are doing more than drawing on the 
culturally available stock of meanings. People may want to achieve a whole host 
of things with their talk such as save face, persuade and rationalize, but there is 
almost always more at stake and which transcends the speciﬁc local interaction. 
Rosenwald (1992: 269) poignantly notes: ‘If a life is no more than a story and a 
story is governed only by the situation in which it is told, then one cannot declare 
a situation unlivable or a life damaged’. Amongst other things it seems to us that 
our personal accounts are also concerned with human potential and 
development, with making our lives by connecting the past with the present and 
future; they are ‘imaginative enterprises’ (Reissman, 1992: 232). 
 
IPA AND OTHER QUALITATIVE APPROACHES 
 
Other phenomenological psychology approaches 
Both phenomenological philosophy and hermeneutic theory are characterised by 
agreement as well as diverse (yet inherently connected) perspectives and 
emphases.  This diversity has provided fertile ground for the development of a 
range of phenomenological psychology approaches which themselves have both 
different and shared emphases and commitments.  These include descriptive 
phenomenology (Giorgi, 1997); hermeneutic phenomenology (Van Manen, 
1990); lifeworld research (Ashworth & Ashworth, 2003; Ashworth, 2016; 
Dahlberg, Dahlberg & Nystrom, 2008); dialogal approach (Halling, 2008) and 
critical narrative analysis (Langdridge, 2007). In what follows we briefly 
describe some of these emphases (for a fuller discussion, see Dowling, 2007; 
Finlay, 2009 and Langdridge, 2007). 
 
A key feature that unites phenomenological psychologists is their interest in 
experience and their belief that studying experience can provide valuable 
insights into human life. Similarly, they are agreed that this study requires 
valuing the evidence of everyday life; it is through the close examination and 
reflection of this life that its meaningfulness and significance is made known.  
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A key concern emerges between the approaches with the differential weight they 
give to the place of description and interpretation. Descriptive phenomenology is 
heavily indebted to the ideas and method of Husserl which aim to develop “the 
hidden intentionalities of consciousness so that we may examine their essential 
structures in a new, presuppositionless manner.” (Kearney, 1994: 18). The end 
result is a description which discloses the phenomenon and shows it in a pure 
and primordial sense. In the context of descriptive phenomenology, this aim 
manifests itself as a greater interest with the universal structures underpinning 
individual experiences of a given phenomenon rather than the individual 
experiences themselves. For example, moving from several singular experiences 
of joy to a structure or class of features which describe ‘being joyful’.  
 
In contrast, IPA is equally indebted to Heidegger and his view that “the very term 
“description” already implies that what is described has been phenomenally 
encountered and interpreted “as” something.” (Churchill, 2014:5). Hence IPA’s 
attention to and incorporation of ideas from hermeneutic theory (see 
Hermeneutics section above) with the goal of valuing particularity, preserving 
variability and acknowledging contingency.  
 
The dialogal approach places a particular emphasis on fostering dialogue 
between researchers in order to deepen understanding of a phenomenon. It aims 
to facilitate a conversation which flickers with what Gadamer called ‘a spirit of 
its own’ and which arises out of authentic collaboration. The approach can be 
described as a discovery process of sustained and regular dialogue over a period 
of time which moves from individual to collaborative understanding. For this 
dialogue to be successful, researchers work at embracing both structure and 
freedom, what Halling has called ‘disciplined spontaneity’. This requires 
researchers to commit to and value collaboration alongside a willingness to live 
with uncertainty and ambiguity; to be comfortable not knowing what the 
dialogue might ‘throw-up’ or where it might take you. 
 
It is also possible for phenomenological researchers to attend to shared aspects 
of the lifeworld in order to deepen understanding of experience. These aspects 
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or fractions are pervasive characteristics of each persons’ lifeworld and include 
temporality, spatiality, embodiment, moodedness, self-hood, sociality, discourse 
and project (Ashworth, 2016). Spatiality refers to the physical environment that 
surrounds us, feelings of interior and exterior space, and our sense of place, 
home and dwelling – in other words, lived space. Attending to this lifeworld 
fraction can shed light on how aging alters a person’s relationship to their home, 
a relationship imbued with physical, cultural and personal meanings (Barry, 
2012).  
 
Finally, a more interrogative stance is taken with critical narrative analysis 
which takes up the hermeneutic insights of Ricoeur, in particular the 
hermeneutics of suspicion.  This approach retains a focus on experience and 
subjective understanding but broadens the context to include the political sphere 
and extends analysis to include aspects of social theory. For example, work on 
sexualities and sexual citizenship (Langdridge, 2013). 
 
These various methods have been described as “a family of approaches, a fuzzy 
set where all share the basic tenets of phenomenology but each articulates an 
approach in a particular way.” (Smith et al, 2009: 200). While exploring the rich 
potential of the different emphases of different phenomenological and 
hermeneutic approaches, we think it is valuable, at the same time, for 
experiential qualitative researchers to recognise their common grounding and 
purpose. 
 
Other qualitative approaches 
Although IPA is an explicitly experiential approach grounded in phenomenology 
and hermeneutics and one which places the person at the heart of all its research 
endeavours, it has always been open to working with other approaches in order 
to deepen experiential and subjective understanding. In the first edition of this 
book we proposed that IPA has a natural afﬁnity with various forms of narrative 
analysis and this is supported by the growing number of studies using IPA and 
some form of narrative approach (Davidsen & Reventlow, 2010; Lavie-Ajayi, 
Almog & Krumer-Nevo, 2012; Thylstrup, Hesse, Thomsen, Heerwagen, 2015). In 
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particular, we see common ground with those approaches which view narrative 
as an “interpretive feat (Bruner, 1987:13); this connects directly to IPA’s 
interpretative commitment as well as taking the view that people are not simply 
tellers of stories but are involved in the mutual constitution of self and world. An 
interest in narrative beyond how it is constructed to how ‘it operates as an 
instrument of mind in the construction of reality’ (Bruner, 1991: 6) chimes with 
IPA’s belief that lived experience is the fundamental unit of analysis. 
For example, in the anger research described earlier in this chapter, we included 
an examination of how counselling sessions for one particular participant had 
begun to disrupt her longstanding narrative of biochemical agents as having 
causal explanation (Eatough and Smith, 2006b). We were struck by how this 
woman appeared caught up in a struggle to re-story her life (Gergen, 1999: 172) 
and how this reconstructive function is a key aspect of many counselling and 
psychotherapeutic approaches. The underlying principle is a narrative one; 
clients are encouraged to re-interpret their lived experiences so that their lives 
become more livable. Indeed, one aim of counselling is to investigate the past so 
that ‘it can be faced, renegotiated and in some respects even relived “but with a 
new ending.” (Jacob, 1986: 5)  
Beyond narrative approaches, there is the potential for fertile links to develop 
with Foucauldian discourse analysis because it shares a concern with how 
discursive constructions are implicated in the experiences of the individual 
(Willig, 2003). For example, in experiential emotion work when participants talk 
about both bottling up and venting anger they often invoke images of a container 
which is unstable and explosive. This symbolization is derived from the 
hydraulic model of emotion which has dominated both popular and scientiﬁc 
discourses throughout the twentieth century. This model supposes that our 
emotions are beyond our control, that they are ‘discharge processes’ that inﬂict 
themselves upon the individual. Consequently, we think of being driven by our 
anger and of our anger being out of control, metaphors which are imbued with 
passivity. This view of anger renders people as passive agents and is implicated 
in how anger is lived and experienced. Just as IPA works iteratively with the 
parts and wholes of participants’ accounts, similarly it can work discursively and 
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experientially, attending to the myriad ways in which discourses are lived in the 
life of a person.  Currently there are a small number of published papers which 
have used these two approaches either together (Johnson, Burrows & 
Williamson, 2004) or as part of a combination of several approaches (Frost, Holt, 
Shinebourne, Esin, Nolas, Mehdizedeh & Brooks-Gordon, 2011; Josselin & Willig, 
2014). 
The past five years or so has seen a welcome and growing interest in pluralist 
approaches within qualitative psychological research (Frost, Nolas & Brooks-
Gordon, 2010; Johnson & Stefurak, 2014). In a recent article for The Psychologist, 
several forms of pluralist approaches were identified, suggesting they share the 
belief that: 
human experience is multidimensional and multi-ontological, 
that its exploration can be better served by combining methods 
to address the research question in many ways, and that 
embracing the differences that different paradigms bring can 
help us better understand the complexities of human experience 
and interaction.  (Shaw & Frost, 2015:2) 
 
These approaches variously embrace pluralism that is methodological (Frost, 
2009), analytical (Barnes, Caddick & Clarke, 2014), interpretative (Coyle, 2010) 
and dialectical (Johnson, 2012). Such diversity bodes well for qualitative 
psychology helping to foster collaboration which avoids ‘methodolatry’ 
(Chamberlain, 2000, 2012) and it is hoped that more qualitative researchers 
including those using IPA will embark on work which incorporates a pluralist 
sensibility. 
 
WHAT DOES IPA RESEARCH LOOK LIKE? 
IPA has produced a steadily growing corpus of research studies since its 
inception in the mid-1990s. In this section we discuss briefly the areas of 
psychology key constructs that seem to be emerging from the corpus, the 
implications of an idiographic sensibility as well as the expansion of data 
collection methods beyond the semi structured interview which is the  
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exemplary technique for IPA researchers. 
 
The reach of IPA beyond psychology into other disciplines as well as its 
application by researchers to an ever-increasing range of topics leads us to 
reflect on whether certain themes can be identified from the corpus of published 
work. Typically, IPA studies explore existential matters of considerable 
importance for the participant. These matters are often transformative, bringing 
change and demanding reﬂection and (re)interpretation for the individuals 
concerned. As a result, it is possible to glean patterns within the studies: a 
concern with identity and a sense of self, a focus on participants’ meaning 
making and an attention to bodily feeling within lived experience. Signiﬁcant 
events and topics may have considerable effect on the sense of self and IPA’s 
detailed ﬁne-grained analyses of individual lived experiences enable these 
effects to come to the fore. 
Issues of identity and self may well emerge as a key organizing principle for IPA 
or even qualitative research more generally (Smith, 2004; Smith et al, 2009) and 
it is unsurprising that this is the case. IPA deals with issues that matter to people 
and that in some way, change or influence how people think about themselves 
and their place in the world. Similarly, IPA’s concern with how participants 
impose meaning on events in their lives generates questions which can tap into 
‘hot cognition’ – those matters in a person’s life which are burning, emotive and 
dilemmatic or those involving ‘cool cognition’ – involving longer-term reﬂection 
across the life course. Increasingly, there is evidence of IPA researchers 
attending more explicitly to bodily experience (especially emotional experience) 
alongside sense making and mentation and this is timely (Gill, 2015; Lewis & 
Lloyd, 2010; Loaring, Larkin, Shaw & Flowers, 2015; Pemberton & Fox, 2013) 
because it connects with recent interest in affect (Wetherell, 2012; Burkitt, 2014; 
Cromby, 2012, 2015) but as importantly, it speaks to how IPA continues to 
develop, often through an engagement with the philosophy that underpins it.  
As previously discussed, IPA is deeply committed to the idiographic method and 
this inevitably has consequences for sample size. The number of participants 
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might range from one to thirty with the norm being towards the lower end, and 
increasingly, there is a clearer and more robust articulation for smaller sample 
sizes (Brocki & Wearden, 2006; Smith et al, 2009). For example, keeping sample 
size small and homogenous and interviewing participants several times (e.g. 
Clare, 2002, 2003; Rodriguez & Smith, 2014; Snelgrove, Edwards & Liossi, 2013) 
is a strategy that retains IPA’s idiographic emphasis whilst embedding any 
emerging patterns in a rich and detailed context. Clearly, a number of factors 
determine sample size: practical restrictions, the richness of individual cases and 
the strength of commitment to a case-by-case approach (Smith and Osborn, 
2003). Nonetheless, IPA studies do not want to lose sight of the particularities of 
individual lives, emphasizing that convergence and divergence across these lives 
are more compelling when they emerge from a case-by-case approach. And 
although IPA wants to retain its ﬂexible, non-prescriptive stance with respect to 
methodological issues such as sample size and strategy, form of data collection 
and so on, it is also increasingly conﬁdent in its promotion of studies with N = 1 
as having a central place in qualitative psychological approaches (Smith, 2004; 
Smith et al, 2009). 
Interviewing is one of the most powerful and widely used tools of the qualitative 
researcher. A range of interview styles are possible and a range of terms are 
adopted for those styles (e.g. structured, semi-structured or unstructured). 
However, as with much else in qualitative research, there is considerable 
variability in how different researchers use these and how they work in practice. 
There is also lively debate about the importance of interviews for qualitative 
research in psychology (see special section on interviewing, Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 2005). 
There is no a priori requirement for IPA to use the interview, and Smith (2004, 
2005) has encouraged more use of other data collection methods such as diaries 
and personal accounts in IPA work. However it remains the case that the 
interview is by far the most common way of collecting data in IPA and for good 
reason – the real-time interaction with the participant gives major ﬂexibility for 
the researcher in facilitating the participant in exploring their lived experience. 
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Typically, the IPA researcher employs semi-structured interviews which means 
developing a set of questions which are used to guide, rather than dictate, the 
course of the interview. One way to think about this is that the participant is the 
experiential expert (Smith & Osborn, 2003), a story-teller not a respondent with 
respect to the topic of interest while the researcher aims to be an enabler who 
helps the participant evoke and bring to life the phenomenon being talked about. 
Equally important is being open and receptive to novel and/or unexpected topics 
and issues introduced by participants. This requires the researcher to facilitate 
the giving and making of an account in a sensitive and empathic manner, 
recognizing that the interview constitutes a human-to-human relationship 
(Fontana and Frey, 2000). An appropriate metaphor for the IPA researcher is a 
traveller who: 
wanders along with local inhabitants, asks questions that lead the 
subjects to tell their own stories of their lived world, and converses 
with them in the original Latin meaning of conversation as 
‘wandering together with’. (Kvale, 1996: 4) 
Thus, the IPA researcher aims to enter into the lifeworld of the participant rather 
than investigate it; to move between guiding and being led; to be consciously 
naïve and open; and to be receptive to change and ambiguity. 
IPA’s continuing development as an experiential qualitative approach is reflected 
in the growing number of studies that employ multi-modal forms of data 
collection alongside the semi-structured interview. These include the use of 
focus groups (MacParland, Eccleston, Osborn, Hezseltine, 2011; Palmer, Larkin, 
de Visser & Fadden, 2010; Tomkins & Eatough, 2010); combining the typical IPA 
interview with other forms of creative interviewing such as the Imagery in 
Movement and Focusing approaches (Boden & Eatough, 2014); asking 
participants to create pictorial representations of their experience (Kirkham, 
Smith & Havsteen-Franklin, 2015; Shinebourne & Smith, 2011); using a photo 
elicitation approach (Lawson & Wardle, 2013); and poetry (Foster & Freeman, 
2008; Gregory, 2011; Spiers & Smith, 2012). 
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
IPA encourages researchers to be imaginative and flexible in the design and 
execution of a research study within the parameters of some clearly accessible 
guidelines. This both/and position speaks to the novice as well as the more 
experienced researcher and highlights the dynamic nature of the research 
process. Qualitative researchers are in the business of wanting to variously 
understand, interpret, explain and know something. This means using tried-and-
tested principles alongside a willingness to adapt these in the face of what 
research throws up– so neither a rule-bound rigidity nor a methodological free-
for-all.  
 
IPA is an experiential psychological approach that draws inspiration from 
phenomenological philosophy and hermeneutic theory. In this spirit, IPA 
encourages researchers using the approach to engage with its theoretical and 
epistemological underpinnings whilst recognizing that they are not philosophers 
and that often their research will be driven by pragmatic concerns. Even so, at 
the very least, IPA wants researchers to assume a sensibility which is imbued 
with these underpinnings, a phenomenological and hermeneutic stance which 
helps them achieve their aims of research that is ‘experience-near’.  
 
It is worth noting that IPA has always positioned itself as an evolving dynamic 
way of doing research and an approach which reflects critically on its 
development. These sentiments are very much in keeping with the spirit of 
phenomenological philosophy and hermeneutics. Smith (2011a, 2011b) 
developed a set of evaluative criteria for IPA research so that IPA researchers 
can examine their work in light of these to ensure that they are sensitive to those 
touchstones and characteristics which define IPA. Smith proposes three quality 
levels (good, acceptable, unacceptable) which can be applied to published papers 
(so the emphasis is on the products of research rather than the process) and he 
delineates these carefully providing detailed examples of work that meets the 
criterion of good. In addition, he identifies the key characteristics that make for a 
good IPA; these include a sustained focus on a particular aspect of experience, 
rich experiential data, assessment of the thematic structure through the use of a 
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measure of prevalence, careful elaboration of themes and of course, a detailed 
interpretative engagement with the material. It is likely that these criteria will be 
honed and further developed and it would be interesting to see the community 
of IPA researchers reflect on their usefulness. 
 
So IPA continues to develop. It is being used to address an ever-wider range of 
research questions in an expanding array of disciplines. We have commented on 
the increasing use of multimodal forms of data collection supplementing the 
tried and tested in-depth interview. And the emergence of the pluralist 
qualitative position offers helpful grounding for the development of studies 
combining IPA with other methodologies. All of this is to be welcomed. For the 
researcher then the challenge, and the opportunity, is to design and conduct high 
quality research exploring the full potential of IPA while retaining its core 
commitment to the importance of sustained engagement with the individual’s 
attempts to make sense of their personal lived experience.  
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